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Introduction
It is tempting, but over simple, to divide fifty years of U.S. relations with India and Pakistan into two periods:
the Cold War, extending from 1947–89, and the post-Cold War years, from 1990 to the present. This division is
misleading for four reasons.
First, U.S. differences with India—in the shape of the Indian nationalist movement—actually began before
independence as they took dissimilar positions on the great war against Nazism and Japanese imperialism. This
strategic divergence helped establish patterns and habits on both sides that persist today. Second, Washington’s
Cold War-derived interest in India and Pakistan waxed and waned; there were long stretches of apathy as well as
the intermittent vigorous pursuit of non-Cold War issues (for example, Jimmy Carter’s introduction, in the late
1970s, of nuclear nonproliferation as a central element of U.S. relations with both states). There were even
occasions when Cold War objectives were supplanted by other regional issues (as from 1965 onward when the
United States and the Soviet Union tacitly, and then explicitly coordinated elements of their respective South
Asian policies—even when they were battling each other in Afghanistan). Third, Washington’s Cold War
interests were themselves very complex, most notably as the object of containment policy came to include
China (after 1949), and then excluded it (after 1970). Finally, U.S. policy makers are bedeviled now, as they
were during the entire Cold War period, by the difficulty of formulating a policy toward either India or Pakistan
when these states appear to be locked in conflict with each other.
These strategic considerations of alliance, containment and balance of power have been difficult enough for
U.S. policy makers to comprehend, and even more difficult to manage. However, Washington also had to
address many other concerns. These include the democratization of South Asia (at the present moment more than
half of the world’s citizens living under democratic rule are to be found in South Asia), the massive growth of
narcotics production in and adjacent to South Asia, expanding trade and investment opportunities, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and most recently, the concerns of nearly a million Americans of
South Asian origin—a factor that has begun to shape the process by which the United States makes its South
Asia policy.
This chapter will summarize the major objectives pursued by successive generations of U.S. policy makers
toward India and Pakistan during and immediately after the Cold War. A chronological overview that traces U.S.
interests, policies, and attitudes for more than five decades is presented in Appendix II, Tables 1A and 1B. Our
more important objective is to see how the United States managed competing demands and countervailing
frustrations during those years. This is not merely an historical exercise: there are important lessons to be
learned from the way in which others pursued varied strategic, economic and ideological objectives, many of
which remain with us today. We conclude by noting recent developments, including efforts to construct a policy
that will do justice to the wide range of U.S. interests that remain embedded in South Asia.
Fifty-Five Years of U.S. Policy
Before The Cold War
Any survey of U.S. relations with India and Pakistan must, ironically, begin five years before their independence
in 1942, when the United States first discovered a significant strategic stake in the Indian subcontinent. Until
then U.S. interest in British India was diffuse, but tended to be supportive of independence (or greater Indian self-
rule). This view stemmed from a Wilsonian belief that independence was morally appropriate and that it would
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help the region move more speedily toward the alleviation of poverty (the most articulate and visible dissenter
from this position was Katherine Mayo, whose views toward Mahatma Gandhi and other Congress leaders grew
progressively more hostile and influential in the 1930s). There were limited commercial and missionary interests
in India, although neither compared with the far more substantial human and material investment in China.
The critical turning point in U.S. policy, which anticipated later India–U.S. disputes, was precipitated by
the decision, in the summer of 1942, of the Indian National Congress to go to prison rather than actively
support the war effort. This, plus the support given to the Axis powers by Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian
National Army, forced the Roosevelt administration into a choice between an ally and a potential friend.
Roosevelt ceased pressuring the British to grant independence, a choice that disillusioned many Indian
nationalists—and one that prefigured later disappointments when Washington was forced to choose among other
allies and a nonaligned India.
The Cold War: A Cluster of Strategies
The onset of the Cold War brought the United States back to South Asia in search of allies (or at least friends)
in another struggle against a global threat. The “loss” of China in 1949 accelerated the search, as did the
discovery that the Soviet Union was catching up in the nuclear arms race, and the consolidation of Soviet power
in central as well as Eastern Europe.
An inventory of U.S. “Cold War” involvement in South Asia from 1949–89 would count at least six
different themes. Over the years these sometimes weakened, often to reemerge five, ten, or twenty years later:
• The Cold War led the United States to think once again about the strategic defense of the region. South Asia
had come under attack by Japanese ground and naval forces in WWII—did it face the same kind of threat
from Soviet, and later Chinese, forces? The United States’ early containment policy, as implemented in
South Asia, was to help India and Pakistan defend against Soviet and Chinese forces. Although their
motive was to obtain arms for their own dispute, both Indian and Pakistani officials stressed to Americans
the risk that the subcontinent faced from the “bear” to the north. Ultimately Pakistan was the recipient of
significant military, economic, and grant programs especially from 1954–65.1 During those years
nonaligned India received considerably more in economic loans and grants, purchased about $55 million in
military equipment from the United States, and $90 million in military grant assistance after the India–
China war of 1962.2 The “second” Cold War, precipitated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, revived
the long-moribund U.S.–Pakistan military relationship, and Pakistan received more than $7 billion in
loans and credits for military and economic assistance until the program was terminated when the Bush
administration concluded (in 1990) that Pakistan’s covert nuclear weapons program violated U.S. law.3
• The Cold War in South Asia also had a domestic front. As the internal vulnerabilities of Pakistan and India
became more evident (especially in light of the Comintern’s 1949 call for revolutionary uprisings
throughout the world), Washington mounted a variety of developmental, intelligence and information
programs in South Asia. The Indian communists were seen to be under the influence of the Soviet Union,
and the United States provided huge amounts of food aid, advice on land reform, and cooperated with Indian
and Pakistani governments in countering their communist parties (Pakistan banned its communist party;
the Congress party worked with the CIA in Kerala and West Bengal, two communist strongholds in India).
The logic of these programs was based on an assumed correlation between poverty and susceptibility to
communism: by encouraging economic growth (and redistributive policies such as land reform) the
communists could be beaten at their own game, and democracy would have a chance even in the poorest
regions of India and Pakistan. Very substantial information/propaganda campaigns were also developed,
balancing the much larger Soviet operations. Although this ideological cold war peaked in the 1950s and
                                                                                            
1. This included $630 million in grant military assistance for weapons, $619 for defense support assistance (construction of
facilities, and salary support for designated units), and $55 million worth of equipment purchased on a cash or concessional basis.
2. The amount might have been much greater had John F. Kennedy, who was very pro-Indian, not been assassinated. Many of the
Indian (and Pakistani) loans, especially those that enabled these countries to buy U.S. grain, were to be paid back in rupees, and
large amounts were subsequently written off.
3. While there was no military grant component to this assistance program, much of the economic assistance was in fact used to pay
back the loans taken to buy hardware. Overall, the economic component of the two packages (1981–87 and 1987–90) was slightly
larger than the military.
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1960s, Washington was, as late as the mid-1980s, still actively countering Soviet disinformation
programs directed toward Indian journalists and politicians.
• The Cold War intermittently made India or Pakistan major prizes in their own right. Despite the poverty of
the region (or perhaps because of it), many in the United States argued that the “real” contest in Asia was
between communist China and democratic India. Imitating Leninist logic (that the vulnerability of the
metropolitan country lay in its colonies), India was seen by some as a pivotal battleground in the Cold
War. The most extreme example of this argument was expounded by Walt W. Rostow who justified the
American intervention in Vietnam on the grounds that if Communist aggression succeeded there, then
Cambodia, Thailand, and ultimately India, the most important of all of the dominoes, would fall to the
communists. (It came as something of a surprise to Indian diplomats to learn that their country was the
reason for U.S. intervention in Vietnam). In the 1980s during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, it was
frequently heard in Washington (more than in Islamabad) that Pakistan was a “front-line” state, and that if
Afghanistan fell, Pakistan—and all of South Asia—would be vulnerable and the Soviets would have a clear
run to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean.
Over time the Cold War, in its South Asian manifestation, acquired other dimensions, and India and
Pakistan themselves came to take advantage of the global bipolar structure:
• Although Indian diplomats were among the first to learn of the Sino-Soviet split, it was Pakistan that
exploited the crack in the communist monolith by helping to arrange the secret visit of Henry Kissinger to
Beijing in 1970, leading to improved U.S. ties with China.
• While at first India’s role as a cofounder and leader of the nonaligned movement was seen in Cold War terms
(John Foster Dulles once criticized Indian “neutrality” as immoral), the ultimate view of all U.S. presidents
from Truman to Lyndon Johnson (including Dwight Eisenhower himself), was that India could be used to
influence the nonaligned movement and that a nonaligned India did little damage to substantive American
interests.
• Finally, as the Cold War wound down, Washington’s relations with New Delhi and Islamabad came to be
quite permissive as far as their movement toward China or the Soviet Union. At the height of the “second”
Cold War in 1980–89, the United States did not try to punish India for its close relationship with the
Soviet Union, but rather attempted what was termed an “opening” to New Delhi in the hope of luring India
away from the Soviets and protecting Pakistan’s southern flank. Nor did Washington worry overmuch
about Islamabad’s continuing diplomatic and economic links to Moscow, despite the savage war being
waged, by proxy, in Afghanistan.
Thus the United States’ Cold War strategic engagement with India and Pakistan was quite varied and
complex. While there was a formal alliance with Pakistan, this did not rule out a close intelligence relationship
with India (India’s major external intelligence agency, Research Analysis Wing, was begun with Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) advice and support) and large amounts of economic aid to both countries.
Reciprocal Fears: Overcommitment and Betrayal
The most contentious issue that dogged U.S. relations with India and Pakistan over the years was the extent of
U.S. obligations to either state and the implications for its relations with the other. This remains, today, a
lively issue, transcending its Cold War roots.
Formally, the only U.S. commitments in the region were to Pakistan, should it be faced with “communist”
aggression. The United States was obliged only to consult if Pakistan were faced by other aggression.
However, informal assurances and transitory arrangements have been common, and these have frequently
given rise to serious miscalculation, especially when accompanied by military assistance or military gestures.
From a U.S. perspective the greatest fear has been overcommitment: being dragged into a purely regional
crisis by India or Pakistan, when no U.S. interests were at stake. The first such crisis was the India–China war,
when Nehru frantically called for direct U.S. military intervention to help turn back the tide of Chinese soldiers.
The U.S. response was to send the USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal as a warning to the Chinese, and to
discuss a long-term military and arms buildup contingent upon movement on the Kashmir problem.
Ironically, the same carrier was in 1971 sent toward the Bay of Bengal (it never quite entered it) as a way of
reassuring Pakistan (and China, Pakistan’s new ally) of U.S. support and opposition to the impending
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occupation of East Pakistan by Indian forces. Again, the signal was only a signal: Indian forces defeated the
Pakistan army and a new state, Bangladesh, was created.
Every American military assistance program in South Asia has generated strong, even vehement objections
from the non-recipient. The United States’ initial program for Pakistan (1954) provided India with the pretext to
back away from its pledge of a plebiscite in Kashmir, and encouraged Delhi’s move toward Moscow. Subsequent
U.S. assistance to India immediately after the 1962 India–China war led Pakistan to move toward China and to
question the value of its ties to the United States. The revival of the U.S.–Pakistan military relationship in the
1980s propelled India toward the Soviet Union and contributed to the largest arms buying spree in regional
history.
United States policy makers have been confronted with the same Hobson’s choice in the nuclear arena. The
United States’ initial reluctance to come down hard on New Delhi for its 1974 nuclear test was taken as further
justification for Pakistan’s own nuclear program. Conversely, when Washington looked the other way while
Pakistan perfected its nuclear program in the 1980s, Indian hawks argued that an Indian nuclear test would be a
fitting response, if only to disrupt the U.S.–Pakistan relationship by forcing Pakistan to conduct a test of its
own.
The Lessons of the Cold War
What strategic lessons can be drawn from the U.S. pursuit of Cold War objectives in South Asia?
First, South Asia came to be seen by two generations of U.S. policy makers as a region of strife, war, and
intractable conflict. The absence of cooperation between India and Pakistan made the region vulnerable to
outsiders and made it hard for the United States to work with either state to pursue common strategic objectives
in or out of the region.
Second, the United States came to the view that their well-intentioned offers of mediation or conflict
resolution were seldom welcomed by both sides and almost never accepted except under duress. In this regard no
issue was more important, and more frustrating, than Kashmir. From the first year of independence (and the
emergence of Kashmir as the core dispute between India and Pakistan) U.S. officials, private citizens,
foundations, and scholars have pressed the two states to resolve, or at least suspend, the conflict so that they
might better manage the joint defense of the Subcontinent and stop the diversion of scarce resources away from
urgent economic and developmental needs. An enormous amount of U.S. political capital was expended on
Kashmir with few positive results.
Third, because of the inability to put together what partition had torn apart—South Asia’s strategic unity—
U.S. administrations often toyed with the idea of choosing between India and Pakistan to help contain the
Soviet Union or China (or at times, both). This view held that the value of an alliance with either India or
Pakistan against a third, non-regional state would be greater than the costs incurred by choosing one or the other
and that the United States could reduce collateral regional political damage by compensatory economic or
military aid programs. However, Washington never could bring itself to make such a choice and stick with it.
When the United States leaned to one side there usually was a compensatory movement in the other direction.
Thus U.S. economic assistance to India peaked at the very moment the U.S. military assistance program to
Pakistan was in full swing; later, when U.S. military equipment began to flow to India, compensatory military
hardware was supplied to Pakistan. Time and again a movement toward one or the other country was partially
balanced by programs with the other.
Fourth, even this policy lapsed from time to time. There were long periods when South Asia simply
vanished from the U.S. strategic map and apathy, rather than engagement, was the norm. The United States was
uninterested in South Asia (and resisted offers of alignment from both India and Pakistan) very early in the Cold
War. It took the victory of the Communist Chinese and a threatening Stalin to tip the balance of opinion in
Washington in favor of an alliance with Pakistan. But by 1964 Washington had become disillusioned with both
Islamabad and New Delhi, and seized the opportunity presented by the 1965 India–Pakistan war to stop military
aid to both countries and to yield the role of regional conflict manager to the Soviet Union. After a brief spell of
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activity in 1970–71, Washington again retreated from the region, only to return after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in December, 1979.
Fifth, as far as South Asia was concerned, it took a crisis to build a policy—or at least to rouse U.S.
strategic interest. Absent a crisis (either a threat to the region by an outside power, or a threat to regional
stability brought about by an India–Pakistan war), U.S. officials tended to regard South Asia as a strategic
sideshow. While it may have been the site of Cold War competition, it was not consistently judged to be vital
territory—at least compared with the oil-rich Middle East, or an industrially vital Europe and northeast Asia.
Finally, U.S. officials and strategists came to their own understanding of the region’s strategic style—the
way in which Indian and Pakistan diplomats set forth their respective positions in the Cold War. The United
States grew wary of Pakistan’s exaggeration of the Indian threat to “Western” and U.S. interests, and came to
heavily discount Islamabad’s pronouncements of the communist threat from the north. Pakistanis had been
saying that “the sky was falling” for forty years, and there was, as of 1978, no evidence that it was going to
happen. This fateful U.S. miscalculation gave Islamabad considerable leverage in its dealings with Washington
after the Soviet Union occupied Kabul on Christmas day 1979. Today Pakistan is widely (if inaccurately)
regarded in Congress and sections of the Executive Branch as a trusted and loyal U.S. ally during the Cold War.
As for India, successive generations of U.S. officials have been driven to distraction by New Delhi’s strategic
style: for many years it seemed that no Indian diplomat’s day was complete unless he or she had lectured an
American on the evils of the Cold War and the self-evident foolishness of the United States supporting Pakistan
against India. Thus, when the Cold War came to an end, Pakistan found itself with a considerable group of
friends and supporters in Washington ( a position it did not have ten years earlier), and India was widely regarded
as pro-Soviet, a bit anti-United States, and having betrayed its own lofty Nehruvian-Gandhian standards on
nuclear and related issues.
Outside the Cold War: Economic Political and Ideological Considerations
The U.S. strategic and military policies in South Asia described above intersected at many points with concern
over the region’s economic and political development. The latter may turn out to be of historically equal or
greater importance. These economic and social concerns had two wellsprings (1) a deep moral concern with
South Asia’s poverty, and (2) the need for economic and social reform to keep the region from slipping into the
communist camp. A third U.S. economic interest is now emerging after decades of disappointment—South Asia
as a prospective area for U.S. investment and as a market for U.S. products.
Official U.S. interest in the social and economic problems of South Asia actually predated the Cold War,
emerging at the very moment during WWII when the region became strategically important. The first, and most
extensive, U.S. exposure to South Asia took place when thousands of impressionable U.S. soldiers and
civilians bound for the China–Burma–India (CBI) theater went to eastern India in 1943. India was then reeling
under the impact of the Bengal Famine of 1943 and was threatened by a Japanese invasion. Many of these young
Americans later contrasted their experience in India with the warm welcome they received in China, where
Americans worked closely with all elements of the anti-Japanese alliance. Both countries suffered from terrible
poverty, but the Chinese seemed to be more eager to cooperate militarily with their U.S. allies.
By default, India’s poverty moved to the forefront of U.S. interests in South Asia. If India, in particular,
would not join any U.S.-sponsored alliances, then the United States could at least help India indirectly, through
economic and developmental projects.
This strategy fit into mainstream U.S. thinking. Many liberal Americans held that high levels of defense
spending by poor states was somehow immoral. It also coincided with the observation that because India and
Pakistan were poor, they had a special obligation to resolve their disputes, and that the United States should
play a useful role in facilitating dialogue. Further, many Americans were especially attracted to India because
Jawaharlal Nehru and other Indian leaders were critical of the waste of the Cold War, with its never-ending cycle
of arms races and huge expenditures on nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (this later led to
disillusionment with India among many U.S. liberals who regarded the Indian nuclear test of 1974 as a morally
appalling betrayal of once shared values).
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Americans have generally held the view that (unlike East Asia or the Middle East, where there were real
strategic stakes) South Asia was first and foremost an economic and social “project”. They found it difficult to
take India seriously as a major power because of its obvious economic weakness. In the 1950s and even the
1960s most Americans were telling their Indian counterparts to “grow more food and fewer children”: India
might be an “emerging” power but it would not be a real power until it put its own economic and social house
in order.
In the 1950s and 1960s this view not only contributed to U.S. efforts to get India and Pakistan to the
bargaining table to settle the Kashmir problem, it helped build support for massive food and economic
assistance to India and Pakistan. These were expanded to include the transfer of modern agricultural technology,
that in turn paved the way for India’s Green and White Revolutions (in grain and dairy production, respectively).
It also led to the establishment of South Asian studies programs at many of the U.S. universities that had
developed a strong stake in India and Pakistan (most importantly the state universities of Illinois, Kansas,
Minnesota, Missouri, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin).
These developmental programs were usually justified in Cold War terms, but they were not solely the result
of realpolitik: they had humanitarian motives that resonated deeply. They were the extension of the U.S.
impulse to do good and share U.S. wealth with less fortunate people. They have been derided as misguided,
patronizing, or unwise, and the U.S. scholars who found their intellectual homes in India and Pakistan have
been labeled as academic imperialists; but a review of these programs—sponsored by hundreds of private groups,
foundations, universities, as well as official U.S. aid and developmental agencies—would reach a net positive
assessment.
Although individual U.S. institutions and individuals had remarkable access to the highest levels of Indian
and Pakistani decision makers,4 U.S. capability to impose economic reforms upon India and Pakistan was
limited. The U.S.-brokered Indus Water treaty of 1960 was publicly disparaged (although privately welcomed) in
both India and Pakistan. Only one President, Lyndon Johnson, tried to force India to change its economic policy
by a “ship to mouth” strategy that only triggered off a strong backlash by Indira Gandhi who felt that Indian
sovereignty was under attack. Jimmy Carter did make an offer of massive aid for an Eastern waters regional
development program, but his real priority for was nonproliferation, and the proposal was never seriously
considered by regional states. Throughout much of the Cold War era U.S. officials were critical of the buildup of
massive state-controlled industries in India, but were reluctant, and in some cases legally prohibited, from
supporting inefficient and “socialist” state-run enterprises.
Only since 1990 and the transformation in Indian economic policy, has U.S. private investment begun to
take India seriously. This, in turn, opens up possibilities that were unimaginable ten or twenty, let alone fifty
years ago. There is, for the first time (even if twenty-five years too late), the possibility of real economic
interdependence between the United States and India and Pakistan. The economic benefits of this interdependence
are obvious, but the political ones are no less important: a strong economic relationship between the United
States and both South Asian states will provide an incentive to manage other issues more carefully. It may be
premature for Indians to envision the kind of reverse dependency relationship that China has achieved with the
United States, but even a limited expansion of economic ties has changed the context in which contentious
political and strategic issues are discussed.
For the first time since Americans came into contact with South Asia the region is seen as other than poor
and wretched. While there is considerable exaggeration of the vast middle class Indian market, U.S. firms
understand the advantages of South Asia as a production site as well as a place to sell goods, and this new
perception has rippled through the bureaucracy and Congress. U.S. corporations now actively lobby Congress
for legislation favorable to the region, although they are reluctant to side with India or Pakistan on contentious
issues (such as the Brown amendment) when it means criticizing the other country—where they might have
important economic interests.
                                                                                            
4. The Ford Foundation’s New Delhi representative in the 1950s could see Nehru at will, and influenced Indian land reform policies
(his counterpart in Pakistan was far less successful).
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Nonproliferation: Right Issue, Wrong Region?
Timing is important in determining which issues achieve high priority and which are relegated to the back
burner. The balance of U.S. policy in South Asia was dramatically tilted in the early 1990s toward a single
issue, nuclear nonproliferation. Had the economic reforms described above taken place earlier, it is possible that
proliferation would not have assumed the importance it has had for the last six years.
The groundwork for the subordination of U.S. regional policy to nonproliferation concerns was established
in 1974, when, stimulated by the Indian nuclear test, the United States came to believe that the world was on
the edge of a rapid burst of nuclear proliferation. Jimmy Carter made nonproliferation the centerpiece of his
foreign policy (until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) and singled out South Asia as a particularly important
target.
In the 1980s nonproliferation ranks were swollen by the suspicion that the Reagan administration had failed
to apply credible sanctions to Islamabad’s covert nuclear program. Ironically, virtually no nonproliferationist
was willing to provide Pakistan with the kind of ironclad security guarantees or military equipment that would
have made its program unnecessary.
Finally, there were a series of intelligence misjudgments that gave the impression that South Asia had
joined the company of such states as Libya, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. After Washington underestimated, in
1987, the severity of the “Brasstacks” crisis, the intelligence community has since exaggerated the crises of
1990, 1992, and 1993 and the risk that India–Pakistan tensions might lead to conventional or nuclear war.5 By
the early 1990s many in Washington felt that South Asia was out of control. The chain of assumptions (widely
held in official circles) was that a war over Kashmir was likely, that this would lead to conventional war, and
this, in turn, could light a nuclear conflagration between India and Pakistan. Further, there was also a strong
disposition for the United States to assume the leadership role in heading off this chain of events. The United
States was thought to have the best intelligence on these sensitive issues and it was thought to have the greatest
leverage over India and Pakistan. All of this suggested a mandate to contain the two South Asian nuclear
programs.
This mandate was bipartisan in its ideological coloration, as was the larger focus on nonproliferation
policy. This was the offspring of a liaison among strategic conservatives (who wanted to make the world safe
for U.S. nuclear weapons) and liberals (who wanted to get rid of all nuclear weapons, and who thought that other
countries would be more susceptible to pressure than the Department of Defense).
The nonproliferation coalition had earlier succeeded in embedding into law many constraints on the conduct
of U.S. policy. These apply to all potential proliferators, even though they are less than effective in the case of
states that believe their very survival is dependent upon nuclear weapons or the maintenance of a nuclear option.
Pakistan is not going to trade this option for five or six airplanes.
The fact that India and Pakistan were the only near nuclear or covertly nuclear states with whom the United
States could have a dialogue, also explains much of the heightened interest in the region at the time. U.S.
officials could, and frequently did, travel to Islamabad and New Delhi to lecture their counterparts on the perils of
nuclear weapons—they were unable or unwilling to do so in Teheran, Pyongyang, or Jerusalem. So India and
Pakistan received a disproportionate amount of official and unofficial attention aimed at “capping, freezing, and
rolling back” the regional nuclear programs, very little of it addressed to the motives and causes of these nuclear
programs. In this respect, the failure of the United States to take seriously, or even respond to, the 1987 “Rajiv
Gandhi initiative” on regional and global disarmament when it was initially proposed, or when it was revived in
1992, was an egregious error, reflecting the assumption that Washington knew better than India (or Pakistan)
what was right in the area of nuclear disarmament. (The Indians were to pay Washington back in kind several
years later when they withstood pressure to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) extension treaty,
                                                                                            
5. For examples of this see the testimony of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, R. James Woolsey, before the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, “Nomination of R. James Woolsey, Hearing,” 103rd Congress, First Session (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1993); and the exaggerated analysis by William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem in their Critical
Mass: The Dangerous Race for a Superweapon in a Fragmented World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).
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and opposed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)). The Rajiv initiative was one of several missed
opportunities to engage the Indians on one of their central objections to the NPT, and to work out an alternative
formulation that might have obtained their limited adherence to the NPT (and subsequently, the CTBT) even if
they did not formally sign it. However Washington was uninterested in compromise, and did not in any case
take the Indian position seriously. A senior White House official in the first Clinton administration once
explained to several members of an Asia Society study group that he would rather have India and Pakistan in the
NPT but violating it, than outside the NPT and adhering to it.
There are fortunately signs that this proliferation-first policy is itself giving way to a more nuanced U.S.
policy toward India and Pakistan. Before addressing this prospect, a few comments are in order on the way in
which the United States makes its South Asia policy, because there was an expectation in 1992 that bureaucratic
reorganization would improve both the substance and the implementation of U.S. South Asia policy.
Organizational Imperatives
Four years ago the Department of State was required by Congress to detach South Asia from the Bureau of Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NEA) and establish a separate bureau for the region. Historically South Asia
had been a subordinate component of NEA and was looked after by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (only
one past NEA Assistant Secretary of State, Philip Talbot, was a genuine South Asian expert). The arrangement
was defended in the bureaucracy on the grounds that an Assistant Secretary could always raise South Asian
issues in meetings with higher officials when he went to discuss “more important” issues such as the Arab-
Israeli peace process, Gulf policy, or relations with Iran. Congress anticipated that the new South Asian bureau,
headed by its own Assistant Secretary, would raise the profile of South Asia within the government, that it
would engage in long-term strategic planning, and that it would better be able to push a policy through the
bureaucracy if it was headed by a more senior official.
As things turned out the new bureau was in difficulty from its birth. It received little support from the State
Department bureaucracy (that had opposed its creation); it lost its chief advocate in Congress (Congressman
Stephen Solarz); most senior Clinton officials knew little and cared less about South Asia, seeing it only as a
suitable target for the prosecution of a tough nonproliferation policy; and finally, other departments never
adjusted their own organizational charts to create separate South Asia bureaus. In this respect, the National
Security Council was most culpable. Only the White House can blend military, economic, political, strategic,
ideological, and other interests, demanding that individual departments follow an integrated national strategy.6
No overall South Asia strategy was ever developed in the first Clinton administration and nonproliferation
issues dominated the U.S.–South Asia discourse. The process was filled with people who had little or no
experience in the region whose primary interest was India’s and Pakistan’s adherence to proliferation-related
treaties.
The one bright spot was the strong interest in South Asia by the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and
Energy. Defense, even though it had its own “counterproliferation” objectives, recognized India’s military and
naval potential, and tried to retain its ties to the Pakistan army. The Department of Commerce, led by Secretary
Ron Brown, identified India as one of the BEMs (Big Emerging Markets), and encouraged visits to the region by
corporate and government officials. The Department of Energy managed to work around legal restrictions on
discussions with India concerning nuclear safety and pursued a wide-ranging dialogue with Indian and Pakistani
counterparts on energy and environmental issues. But these departments cannot develop or formulate a national
strategy, they can only function within the constraints of that strategy.
                                                                                            
6. One of the most important recommendations of the Council report is that a senior National Security Council official be given full-
time responsibility for South Asia.
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Making South Asia Relevant
Starting Over
In the past five years, while the Clinton administration seemed to be stuck on nuclear issues, there appeared a
number of U.S. studies of the future relationship between the United States and India and Pakistan. Most of
these reports identified certain common features:
• First, South Asia has been under-appreciated. Both the recent Asia Society and Council on Foreign
Relations reports note that South Asia contains more than one fifth of the world’s population, that it holds
the largest number of people living under democratic conditions, that the Indian and Pakistani economies
are potential major markets, that regional instability (including the possibility of nuclear war) demands
U.S. attention and concern, and that India and Pakistan might, in the future, play a major strategic role to
the west (in the Persian Gulf), the north (Central Asia), and the east (Southeast Asia).
• Second, these studies all argued that the number and importance of U.S. strategic, economic, and
ideological interests embedded in South Asia are not matched by attention given to the area, especially to
South Asia’s largest power, India. All of them suggest a new look at the region, and some of them offer
quite specific steps that might be taken to remedy the situation.
However, with a few exceptions, the more specific the proposal, the greater the disagreement among the
U.S. regional and strategic specialists who have signed or written these reports. They differ strikingly in their
recommendations concerning such issues as nuclear proliferation, a strategic relationship with New Delhi, and
American intervention to help settle the Kashmir problem. Should the United States abandon its proliferation
objectives in the region, or should it increase pressure on India and Pakistan? Should it seek an alliance with
India to help counter growing Chinese influence (risking its relationship with Pakistan)? Would greater U.S.
involvement in Kashmir make it less likely that other objectives can be achieved? Any five U.S. experts on
South Asia will offer six different recommendations.
These and other differences in U.S. policies suggests a larger issue: the difficulty of formulating a policy (or
policies) toward a region where there are genuine U.S. interests, but none of them vital. Can the United States
organize itself to deal with the one fifth of the world that is not a threat to U.S. security, that does not show
signs of calamitous collapse, that has not yet (and is unlikely to become) a major economic partner, and that
persists in expanding a political ideology that is not hostile to U.S. values? When a country—the United
States—has been engaged in a global struggle against totalitarianism for two generations—from 1942–90—it is
hard to mobilize American policy makers, let alone Congress, around a non-threat to strategic, political,
economic, and moral interests. During the Cold War, the United States accomplished many useful things in
South Asia but the rationalization of the Cold War was always available to policy makers; a threat, real or
potential, could always be conjured up in the service of an otherwise worthwhile objective. The discipline
imposed by a geopolitical framework—even a flawed one—forced U.S. policy makers to treat the region as a
whole. This has not been apparent since 1989–90. Paradoxically, the absence today of a threat to South Asia, or
to the United States from South Asia, makes it difficult to persuade the policy and legislative communities to
support a policy in which real, but limited, U.S. interests are advanced.
A Glimpse of the Future?
The contours of a U.S. policy toward India and Pakistan can be vaguely discerned, although it remains unclear as
to whether the second Clinton administration or its successor will address South Asia with anything like the
attention it received during much of the Cold War.
A sound U.S. policy must meet several criteria. First, it must devote proportionate attention to the U.S.
diverse interests in South Asia. South Asia should not be moved to the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda,
but neither should it languish as a policy backwater. Policy makers, the press, legislators, and even academics
must resist the temptation of rushing to respond to the latest regional crisis, and completely ignoring important,
although secondary, long term interests. Second, it must be realistic, which means that it must be achievable
with available resources. Third, such a policy must be (and can be) low cost; South Asia does not need elaborate
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aid programs, risky military commitments, or the diversion of significant U.S. resources—except the scarcest
resource of all, the serious attention of senior policy makers and Congress.
With these criteria in mind, the following cluster of policy goals seem to meet these criteria. They also
have the advantage of being internally self-reinforcing—that is, progress in one area can lead to movement in
another. Indeed, U.S. policy should be seen as advancing along a broad front: pressing too hard on a single issue
will be detrimental to other important interests, and in the end could be self-defeating.
A new American policy in south Asia will have to emerge from the confluence of five different interest
clusters:
The first is the encouragement of the process of economic liberalization, which has provided (in the words
of the Asia Society study group) a new “ballast” for U.S. relations with India and Pakistan. Market reform, tariff
reduction, the elimination of state subsidies for inefficient industries, and the promotion of regional free trade
zones are all policies that are in U.S. interests—and those of India and Pakistan. However, as democracies, India
and Pakistan are especially sensitive to distortions and inequalities generated by uneven economic growth. U.S.
policy makers, corporations, and investors must be sensitive to the fact that growth without social justice will
be politically unacceptable in lively, multi-party democracies. A rising tide raises all boats, but in the real world
some boats rise sooner than others, and no emotion is more politically explosive than envy.
Second, the United States should continue its encouragement and strengthening of democratic institutions in
India and Pakistan. Quite apart from the intrinsic moral value of democratization, this has three important
byproducts.
• A democratic India and Pakistan are less likely to engage in human rights violations, and will be more
sensitive to international criticism in this area.
• A democratic India, and democratizing Pakistan are not only more compatible with the further movement
toward market reforms, but will be sensitive to the abuses that market systems can produce. Elections are
powerful ways of ensuring that economic growth will be equitable, both geographically and in terms of
social class and rural-urban divisions.
• Democratic states are less likely to go to war than nondemocracies. Over time, mature democracies develop
political, cultural, and economic links that increase their interdependence and influence the gain-loss
calculation regarding the use of force. No politicians in South Asia understand this better than the current
Indian and Pakistani prime ministers, Inder K. Gujral and Nawaz Sharif.
America’s third and fourth regional goals should be to promote strategic normalization between New Delhi
and Islamabad and assist them in managing their de facto possession of nuclear weapons. The former is an old
objective of the United States, but still a worthy one. However change will not come quickly. All unstable or
weak democracies find it difficult to accommodate each other on Kashmir (or even Siachin); a process of internal
debate and dialogue will have to proceed in both states. Thus the United States should not press for a quick
“solution” to the Kashmir problem, but help create the conditions under which such a solution, satisfactory to a
wide range of the political community in both countries, can emerge. Further, strategic normalization has
consequences for U.S. concerns over the spread of nuclear weapons in South Asia. The anti-proliferationists may
be correct in their assessment of the disruptive role of nuclear weapons elsewhere, but in South Asia they
provide Pakistan with the confidence to deal with India and for India they are an additional incentive to normalize
its ties with Pakistan. It is unlikely that Pakistan or India will give up nuclear weapons in the next ten years,
but a realistic goal would be to create the conditions in which neither sees any gain in moving their programs
forward. Any U.S. legislation that hampers Washington’s ability to maintain the present situation needs to be
reexamined—we have let the best become the enemy of the good.
A fifth major foreign policy goal should be to develop a dialogue about short-term and long-term strategic
cooperation with India and Pakistan. There is no such dialogue at the present moment (although the Department
of Defense, in its quite independent policy toward South Asia, has tried to begin one). There are contingencies,
immediate and distant, that need to be discussed. In the short run India and Pakistan may be able to expand their
peacekeeping and stabilizing role in regions adjacent to South Asia. In the long run the emergence of China as
an aggressive power could raise profound issues for all three states. Pakistan would have to decide whether its
quasi-alliance with China might not drag it into conflicts for which it was ill-equipped; India, also must decide
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whether it is easier to wean a totalitarian, powerful China away from Pakistan, or whether it is better to attempt
to wean a newly democratic Pakistan away from China. Finally a violent, or expansionist China may not pose
the same kind of threat to India and the United States at the same time—would New Delhi allow itself to be
used as a “front-line state” against China, or would the United States be willing to come to India’s assistance in
the event of a crisis? These are still hypothetical questions—and there is a strong possibility that they will
remain hypothetical, but they need to be discussed between Americans and Indians, Americans and Pakistanis,
and most importantly, between Pakistanis and Indians.
How does one get from here to there? In the past, U.S. policy toward India and Pakistan was formulated and
implemented from the top down in the context of a global strategic conflict. Policy could be discussed among a
fairly small circle of officials, Senators, Congressmen and “old India hands”. For most of the Cold War period
South Asia attracted neither a large lobby based on ethnic origins, nor an interested business community, nor an
ideologically motivated group of academics and intellectuals (these were divided along pro-Indian and pro-
Pakistani lines, derived largely from their initial regional exposure). Except for brief periods (as when U.S. arms
were delivered to Pakistan during the height of the Bangladesh crisis, or during the Indian “Emergency” of 1975)
the region never attracted the passions associated with U.S. China policy, its actions in Central and Latin
America, or the Southeast Asian intervention.
Now there is less interest at the top, but a growing activism at the grass roots. Human rights groups find
South Asia especially interesting because they can readily visit the somewhat less than perfect democracies in
the region; U.S. business and investment communities, uneasy about their investments in China, have doubled
and tripled investment in India during the past five years; there are now active, affluent “ethnic” lobbies, of
Americans of Pakistani and Indian origin, with a presence in nearly every Congressional district, eager to
influence policy that affect their former homelands. And, of course, traditional concerns with strategic
cooperation, the spread of nuclear weapons, and other “high” policy issues continue as before.
While U.S. interests in South Asia are now more diverse than during the Cold War, the policy process has
not adapted to the management of this complexity. Because there can be no return to the overarching framework
that characterized U.S. policy during the Cold War years, the process has to begin at the other end: the
development of coalitions among and among various groups and interests that regard South Asia as important.
The expansion of the policy process, and the growing diversification of U.S. regional entanglements,
should not, in a democracy, be seen as a negative development. Lobbying has the consequence of expanding
regional interest across the ideological spectrum and educating otherwise uninterested politicians and bureaucrats.
With the democratization of Pakistan, and the liberalization of the economies of both India and Pakistan (and the
strategic stalemate brought about by their respective nuclear “options”) the terms of the debate between the two
countries has moved to a higher, more secure, and more democratic plateau. This will soon be reflected in the
degree of cooperation between Indian and Pakistani officials and lobbying groups on issues where they have a
shared interest (immigration, U.S. trade and investment policy, high level visits, global trade policies, human
rights concerns, and containing the regional arms races), all interests shared by many Americans.
An objective assessment of the importance of India and Pakistan over the next decade will see it as less a
threat than as a region where there is a significant opportunity to advance important, diverse, and positive U.S.
interests. The immediate challenge to U.S. policy in South Asia in the post Cold War period will be to stay
ahead rather than trail behind these generally positive trends.
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Appendix II: America and South Asia: A Chronological Outline
Table 1A: American Perceptions of South Asia, 1920s–1960s
1920s–1930s 1940s 1950s–1960s
Major Cause of
Conflict
Recalcitrant British refuse to
allow greater freedom to
Indians
Massive threat to region, and
world, from Axis powers
Threat to South Asia from
Communism
Secondary Cause
of Conflict
Poverty, lack of education Reluctance of British to grant
freedom to not-quite trust-
worthy Indians
Domestic communist threat
because of poverty of
regional states
Dominant
American policy
Support Indians morally,
economically and
politically; press the
British
Support British, politically
and with substantial
military investment in
India
Seek real or tacit alliance with
any South Asian state
willing to side with the
United States
Secondary
American Policy
Support humanitarian and
exchange programs
Keep lines open to Indian
nationalists, even at the
risk of angering British
Economic and developmental
aid to counter domestic
influence of communists
U.S. View of
Regional States
(or leaders)
Seen as morally superior,
worthy of American
support
Indian leaders are great
disappointment,
unrealistic, and possibly
untrustworthy on larger
strategic issues; Americans
in CBI greatly impressed
by poverty of Eastern India
Pakistani generals and
Indian politicians need to
achieve political stability
at home and conduct
dialogue with each other
View Toward US
by Regional
States (or leaders)
Wilsonianism of U.S. seen as
model of anti-colonial
state; limited private
contacts with mixed results
(Rocke-feller and
missionaries vs. Katherine
Mayo)
Contradictory: disappointed
at U.S. failure to force
British from India,
impressed by U.S. military
capabilities; India and
Pakistan both seek alliance
Nehruvian concern with U.S.
dominance and materialism;
Pakistan seeks dependency
relationship
Expectation of other
global powers
British will resist, but should
eventually yield to moral
force
In due course, the British will
relent
Soviet and Chinese
communists are external
threats to South Asia
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Table 1B: American Perceptions of South Asia, 1970s–1990s
1970s 1980s 1990s-ff.
Major Cause of
Conflict
No threat to region after
1965; threat is regional
poverty, dictatorships
Soviets a real threat to
Pakistan and thus all of
South Asia
Accidental or deliberate war
between India and
Pakistan, with high risk of
nuclear war (“most
dangerous region in the
world”)
Secondary
Cause of
Conflict
Possible acquisition of
nuclear weapons (after
Indian 1974 test)
Threat to India and Pakistan
from each other, including
nuclear proliferation
Spread from the region of
nuclear, chemical,
biological, and missiles
Dominant
American
policy
Region is strategically and
economically marginal
Provide security assurances
and military and economic
assistance to Pakistan
Direct pressure on India and
Pakistan to conform to
international
nonproliferation regimes,
and sign related treaties
(NPT, CTBT)
Secondary
American
policies
Limited economic aid
programs, pressure on
Indian nuclear program
Encourage India–Pakistan
dialogue, economic
reform, and many other
issues (narcotics, human
rights, proliferation)
Encourage confidence-
building measures,
dialogue, conflict-
avoidance measures,
economic reform,
resolution of Kashmir
“flashpoint”
View of
Regional
States (or
leaders)
Foolish, self-centered, and
destructive group, not
capable of serious
dialogue; Pakistanis worse
than Indians
Pakistan will remain an ally,
India will not provoke a
war or tilt toward Soviet
Union
Don’t know whether regional
states are friends or threats
to U.S. interests;
skepticism about their
domestic bona fides, also.
View of U.S. by
Regional
States (or
leaders)
Disillusioned Pakistan
becomes nonaligned and
India pro-Soviet, United
States seen as less relevant
to regional security,
irrelevant to regional
economic strategies
Pakistan exploits United
States on Afghanistan to
protect its own nuclear
program: Indian fears of
U.S. tilt revived;
“opening” to United States
to minimize damage
U.S. obsession with nuclear
issues and human rights
coupled with Iraq war raises
possibility of America as
threat to India or Pakistan
Expectation of
other global
powers
Soviets a sometimes partner
(Tashkent), not a threat to
the region
China the ally against Soviet
presence in Afghanistan,
ambivalent proliferation
role
Russia, Japan, People’s
Republic of China, etc.
partners in containing
South Asian proliferation
and managing regional
conflict
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